雜想：強國論-國家體制的欠缺面

法蘭西斯 福山

福山曾著《歷史之終結與最後一人》一書成名，他斷言說歷史將終結於民主自由與資本主義，是故共產主義政權將潰散，中國將走向開放市場。就最近中國的政治發展現況來看，福山的論證成為事實。然而，中國正開放的經濟，以其股市狂熱為例，中國政府雖祭出不少的降溫政策，卻仍澆熄不了中國人對『coco』貪婪的本性。20世紀末恐怖主義席捲全球，『如何重新建構國家體制』變成為最新的熱門議題，歸結來說，自由主義『看不見的那隻手』讓國家遠離人們的經濟生活，而恐怖主義『看不見的炸彈』讓國家重新被人民所依賴。《強國論》分成四章，Eliza將成四篇心得來為各位看官介紹…..

第一章 國家體制的欠缺面
*討論1：如何將健全的體制轉移到開發中國家？？
福山認為自911事件之後，國家體制的必要性更加突顯，現代化的世界（已開發國家）其政治與自由文化，讓所謂低度開發國家不停朝向其發展，一去不回頭，但是有多少開發中國家或未開發國家能轉型到已開發國家呢？事實上，人們漸漸質疑『西方自由世界的體制與價值觀是否放諸四海而皆準？』
1980年代與1990年代政治的重要特徵，就是自由主義在已開發中國家捲土重來，也試圖遏阻甚至逆轉國家部門的擴張 (Posner,1975)，這概念隨著杭亭頓所謂的『第三波』(third wave)民主化風潮傳播於開發中國家，例如當時許多共產主義國家、拉丁美洲、亞洲與非洲國家紛紛擺脫威權統治。
福山進一步強調『在開發中國家，國家部門經常是成長的障礙，長期而言只能透過經濟自由化來對治。不過問題在於，國家部門儘管在某些領域應該收斂，但是在其他領域卻必須強化』(Fukuyama,2006)。總結而言，若國家體制並未健全，其經濟自由化的後果反而是會每況愈下，悔不當初，所以要將健全體制轉移到開發中國家，首要的工作便是釐清其國家體制的本質及欠缺的體制功能為何。

*討論2：制度的供應面向
福山論證『制度效能』這個核心議題可先從制度的供應面開始探討，就對經濟發展而言，哪些制度最具關鍵地位？又該如何設計？這問題牽涉到國家本質的四個深層面向：(1).組織的設計與管理；(2).政治體系設計；(3).合法化的基礎；(4).文化與結構因素…其歸結如該書第63頁，表1.2





*討論3：制度的需求面向

政治學者討論國家制度的需求面向各有其不同的觀點，以提利(Charles Tilly,1975)的觀點而言，他認為引發需求的因素往往不是內部衝突，而是劇烈的外源性震撼，諸如貨幣危機、經濟衰退、惡性通貨膨脹、革命或戰爭。然而，福山並不這樣認為，他認為國家體制建構與制度改革的成功案例，大部分都是緣起於其社會內部制度產生強大需求，例如現代初期的歐洲、獨立戰爭之後的美國、1960年代的南韓與台灣等等。然而福山也舉出這些國家遭遇到國際援助的矛盾情節：『…捐助策略的矛盾衝突在於：外國捐助者懷有雙重期待，一方面要強化受援助國政府提供灌溉、公衛、初等教育等服務的能力；但另一方面也想自行為終端使用者提供這些服務。由於外國捐助者受到種種誘因吸引，到頭來總是第二個目標佔據上風』。
福山舉提供於南非洲國家的愛滋病患者『反轉錄病毒藥物』的政策為例，外國捐助者有兩種治療愛滋病患的途徑可以選擇，第一種途徑『完全利用受援助國的公衛基礎措施』即是訓練該國官員、醫師與其公衛人員。然而，這種途徑的成效全然仰賴於受援助國執行援助計畫的能力，其基礎的公衛設施、官員的人謀不贓的程度。第二種途徑就是援助國家直接掌控，受捐助國家通常只能做冷板凳。由上可知，第一種途徑與第二種途徑的差異在於兩者的參與度。



Francis Fukuyama http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Fukuyama
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Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (born October 27, 1952, Chicago, Illinois), an American philosopher, political economist and author.

Writings
Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. Fukuyama's prophecy declares the eventual triumph of political and economic liberalism.
He has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original "end of history" thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter "human nature", thereby putting Liberal Democracy at risk. One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize in an environment in which as he says history is not at an end because science and technology are not at an end.
Also among them is The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order. In this book, he explores where social norms come from and talks about how the current disruption, due to the shift from the manufacturing age to the information age, is normal and will correct itself due to the need for humans to have social norms and rules.

[edit] Relationship to Neoconservatism
Politically, Fukuyama has in the past been considered neoconservative. He was active in the Project for the New American Century think tank starting in 1997, and signed the organization's letter recommending that President Bill Clinton overthrow the then-President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein [1]. He also signed a second, similar letter to President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attacks that called for removing Saddam Hussein from power "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack."[2].
Thereafter, however, he drifted from the neoconservative agenda, which he felt had become overly militaristic and based on muscular, unilateral armed intervention to further democratization within authoritarian regimes (particularly in the Middle East). By late 2003, Fukuyama withdrew his support for the Iraq War [3] and called for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation as Secretary of Defense [4]. He said that he would vote against Bush in the 2004 election,[5] and said Bush made three major mistakes:
The threat of radical Islam to the US was overestimated.
The Bush administration didn't foresee the fierce negative reaction to its benevolent hegemony. From the very beginning it showed a negative attitude towards the United Nations and other international organizations and didn't see that this would increase anti-Americanism in other countries.
The Bush administration misjudged what was needed to bring peace in Iraq and was overly optimistic about the success with which social engineering of Western values could be applied to Iraq and the Middle East in general.
Fukuyama's current beliefs include the following: the US should use its power to promote democracy in the world, but more along the lines of what he calls realistic Wilsonianism, with military intervention only as a last resort and only in addition to other measures. A latent military force is more likely to have an effect than actual deployment. The US spends more on its military than the rest of the world put together, but Iraq shows there are limits to its effectiveness. The US should instead stimulate political and economic development and gain a better understanding of what happens in other countries. The best instruments are setting a good example and providing education and, in many cases, money. The secret of development, be it political or economic, is that it never comes from outsiders, but always from people in the country itself. One thing the US is good at is the formation of international institutions. These would combine power with legitimacy. But such measures require a lot of patience. This is the central thesis of his most recent work America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy.
In an essay in the New York Times Magazine in 2006 that was strongly critical of the invasion [6], he identified neoconservatism with Leninism. He wrote that the neoconservatives
...believed that history can be pushed along with the right application of power and will. Leninism was a tragedy in its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States. Neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something I can no longer support.
His previous comments on militarism, for instance, that "[i]t is precisely because American foreign policy is infused with an unusually high degree of morality that other nations find they have less to fear from its otherwise daunting power”, are, no doubt, an expression of "Wilsonianism" with a realistic touch. He also announced the end of the "neoconservative moment" and argued for the demilitarization of the war on terrorism:
"[W]ar" is the wrong metaphor for the broader struggle, since wars are fought at full intensity and have clear beginnings and endings. Meeting the jihadist challenge is more of a "long, twilight struggle" whose core is not a military campaign but a political contest for the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims around the world.
If he has distanced himself from the label of neoconservatism, he remains indebted to Leo Strauss, purported father of neoconservatism, for much of the theoretical basis of his political economics. In Our Posthuman Future he takes a Straussian stance, defending a classical doctrine of natural right. He says his argument is Aristotelian and that
Aristotle argued, in effect, that human notions of right and wrong--what we today call human rights--were ultimately based on human nature.
(p.12)[citation needed]